Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality
Volume 31

Issue 2

Article 8

December 2013

Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime
Regulation
Elizabeth S. Scott

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawandinequality.org/
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31(2) LAW &
INEQ. 535 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol31/iss2/8

Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

535

Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and)
Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation
Elizabeth S. Scottt
This is an exciting period of change in juvenile crime
regulation, and the Supreme Court's three Eighth Amendment
opinions rejecting the constitutionality of harsh sentences imposed
on juvenile offenders are a big part of the excitement. Three times
in seven years the Court has considered questions relating to the
sentencing of juvenile offenders. First, in 2005, in Roper v.
Simmons,' the Court prohibited the death penalty for a crime
committed by a juvenile offender. In 2010, in Graham v. Florida,
the Court struck down the sentence of life without parole (LWOP)
for non-homicide offenses. Finally, in 2012, in Miller v. Alabama,'
the Court held that a statute mandating the sentence of LWOP for
homicide amounted to cruel and unusual punishment when
applied to a juvenile offender. The Supreme Court, indeed, seems
to be on a roll.'
This morning I want to explore the importance of these
Eighth Amendment cases, particularly Miller, mostly in terms of
their meaning for juvenile crime regulation. The Court tells us in
emphatic terms that young offenders, because they are
developmentally immature, are less culpable than their adult
counterparts and more likely to reform-and that these differences
are important to the legal response to juvenile crime.' This
t. Harold R. Medina Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The author
presented this essay as a keynote address at a symposium conference sponsored by
Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice at the University of

Minnesota Law School on October 4, 2012. Thanks to Annie Steinberg for research
assistance and to Jamie Buskirk and the other Journal editors for organizing the
symposium.
1. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
2130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
3. No. 10-9646, slip op. at 27 (S. Ct. June 25, 2012).
4. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99 (2011) (holding in
2011 that in evaluating whether the failure of a law enforcement officer to give
Miranda warnings to a youth he was questioning resulted in exclusion of the
youth's statement, the age of a youth is relevant to the determination of whether he
understood that he was free to leave).
5. Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 9 (discussing how specific attributes of youth
such as rashness and a less developed ability to assess consequences "diminish the
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile
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message represents a way of thinking about youth crime that has
begun to take hold in the first decade of the twenty-first centurypartly in response to the Court's opinions, but also independently
Contemporary lawmakers have
for reasons I will discuss.
science for guidance in
to
developmental
turned
increasingly
that both fairness and
recognizing
policies,
formulating justice
differential
treatment of
promoted
by
goals
are
social welfare
offenders.'
adolescent
This approach is very different from that of the 1990s, a
period when young criminals were seen as vicious "superpredators"' and a series of moral panics swept the country,
resulting in the transformation of traditional juvenile justice
policies. In this hostile climate, the goals of punishing young
offenders and protecting the public trumped other considerations,
and the importance of differences between juvenile and adult
offenders was either ignored or denied.'
Although we might be happy to put it behind us, I want to
begin my talk by focusing on that period of recent history-hence
my title-the past and future of juvenile crime regulation. My
suggestion is that we can learn useful lessons if we understand the
dynamics of moral panic decision-making and compare it to the
scientifically-based and more deliberative approach to juvenile
crime regulation that the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed
and that lawmakers are at least tentatively beginning to adopt.'
My plan is to tell the story of what has been a dramatic
period in juvenile justice policy over the past generation (too
dramatic sometimes), focusing on factors that have contributed to
a changing legal environment and highlighting the differences
between the approach to lawmaking in this realm in the late
twentieth century and more recent approaches. Finally, I will
propose that it may be possible to adopt strategies to limit the
harmful impact of moral panics that inevitably will arise in the
future-and to reinforce the current policy direction.

offenders").
6. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE

JUSTICE 94-102 (Harvard Univ. Press 2008).
7. John Dilulio, coined the term "super-predator". John Dilulio, The Coming of
the Super--Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23 (coining the term
"super-predator" and sounding the alarm about a coming wave of violent,
dangerous youths growing up in moral poverty).
8. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 4-5.
9. See id. at 265-83.
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I.

The Moral Panics of the 1990s
Youth crime was a hot political issue in the 1990s.10 The
concern began as a response to a threat that warranted attention."
Violent juvenile crime, particularly homicide, increased
dramatically in the late 1980s. The public reacted with alarm,
exacerbated by a widespread perception that the juvenile justice
Not
system was ineffective in dealing with the problem."
surprisingly, politicians responded to the public's concern and, in
less than a generation, almost every state had changed its laws to
make it easier to prosecute and punish juveniles as adults." This
happened through several types of legal reforms. The age of
transfer to criminal court was lowered and the range of transfereligible offenses expanded." Further, under legislative waiver
statutes, youths charged with particular offenses were
categorically excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction." Many
states shifted the authority to make jurisdictional decisions from
judges to prosecutors.
In the juvenile system, dispositions got
harsher and the use of incarceration increased substantially."
This is a familiar story that need not be repeated. Suffice it to say
that during this period, a legal regime that had viewed most
teenage crime as the product of youthful immaturity was
transformed into one that was often ready to ignore differences
between young offenders and their adult counterparts as
irrelevant to criminal punishment."
Supporters defended these changes as simply a coherent
policy response to a new generation of violent juveniles, and
10. See id. at 265.
11. See OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, STATISTICAL BRIEFING
BOOK:
JUVENILE
ARREST
RATE
TRENDS,
available
at

http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_.Display.asp?ID=qa05200
(showing
increasing rates of juvenile arrest rate trends from 1980 to the late 1990s).
12. Jane B. Sprott, Understanding Public Opposition to a Separate Juvenile
System, 44 CRIME & DELINQ. 399 (2001) (finding support for the view that the
juvenile system's laxness encourages youth crime).
13. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 4-5.
14. Id. ("Under the traditional legal regime, the transfer to criminal court of a
minor charged with a crime was a rare occurrence. That is no longer the case.").
15. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., STATE RESPONSES TO
SERIOUS
AND
VIOLENT JUVENILE
CRIME
3-9
(1996),
available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf [hereinafter STATE RESPONSES].
16. Id.
17. See STEVE Aos, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON STATE:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE COST-EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2002), available at

http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=02-10-1201 (describing the increased use
of incarceration in Washington state).
18. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 4-5.

538

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 31:535

recognizing that the traditional regime was outmoded and unable
to protect the public." Yet even when the reforms were motivated
by legitimate concerns, the process often had the hallmarks of a
moral panic-a dynamic that has long interested sociologists,2 in
which the media, politicians, and the public interact in a pattern of
escalating alarm in response to a perceived social threat.2 ' The
danger that sparks a moral panic is often real. Think, for
instance, about child sexual abuse.2 2 What distinguishes a moral
panic from a straightforward response to a pressing social problem
is the gap between the perception of the severity of the threat and
the reality.
This certainly describes the response to juvenile crime in the
1990s.
Media coverage of violent juvenile crime increased
dramatically during this period." Stories about high profile
crimes-school shootings and gang killings of innocent
bystanders-generated public outrage and fear, and particular
crimes often came to represent a larger threat.' Prosecutors and
politicians, eager to demonstrate their concern for victims and for
19. See New Juvenile Code Would Come Down Hard on Teens, LUDINGTON
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15, 1996, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&dat=
19950113&id=ODRQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=UFUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5523,814670
(quoting Michigan Governor John Engler suggesting that the current juvenile
justice system was designed "for kids stealing hubcaps in the '50s, not for some of
the things we see today").
20. Stanley Cohen was probably the first sociologist to study and analyze moral
panics in a study of British "Mods" and "Rockers" published in 1972. See STANLEY
COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (3d ed. 2002); see also ERICH GOODE &
NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE
22 (2d ed. 2009) (offering comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment of
moral panics).
21. GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 20, at 21-33.
22. The molesting and killing of a seven-year-old New Jersey child, Megan
Kanka, by a neighbor, led states across the country to pass laws mandating
registration of sex offenders. See Kimberly McLarin, Trenton Races to PassBills on
Sex
Abuse,
N.Y. TIMES,
Aug.
30,
1994,
at
A27,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/30/nyregion/trenton-races-to-pass-bills-on-sexabuse.html (discussing noting that the law went before the New Jersey Senate
thirty days after Megan's death). Earlier, charges of satanic ritual sexual abuse
against employees and the owner of a day-care center generated alarm across the
country. See Margaret Talbot, The Devil in the Nursery, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 7,
2001, available at http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2001/
the-devil in the nursery (describing hysteria and the trials of an accused worker).
23. See GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 20, at 35-37 (describing
exaggeration of the threat as an element of moral panic).
24. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Terror in Littleton: The Reasons; Violence by
Youths: Looking for Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at A17, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/22/us/terror-in-littleton-the-reasons-violence-byyouths-looking-for-answers.html.
25. Id.; see also DEWEY G. CORNELL, SCHOOL VIOLENCE: FEARS VERSUS FACTS
(Lane Akers ed., 2006).

2013]

JUVENILE CRIME REGULATION

539

public safety, promised punishment of offenders and protection
from young criminals generally. Legislation often followedeffectively institutionalizing the moral panic.26
A striking feature of this story is the way that young
offenders were depicted. In the somewhat idealized rhetoric of the
traditional juvenile court, delinquents were "children"-immature
youths who had gone astray.27 By the mid-1990s, they had become
"super-predators"-remorseless creatures who roamed in gangs,
maiming and killing without moral compunction and considering
no consequences other than their own evil gratification. 28
Criminologist John Dilulio, who coined the term, also predicted
that the problem would only get worse when the large birth cohort
of the early 1990s reached adolescence in the early twenty-first
century.29 The super-predator label and stereotype were picked up
by politicians and the media," as was the sense of urgency that
something must be done to protect the public from the threat.
Young offenders were no longer wayward youths in the public
imagination-they had become the enemies of society." This
characterization may have been easier for many Americans to
accept because it was assumed that offenders were minority
youths, since membership in juvenile gangs, the focus of media
attention, was often limited by race and ethnicity."
26. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 4-5.
27. See Justine Wise Polier, Dissenting View, in JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
PROJECT: STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 67 (1982).
28. See Dilulio, supra note 7, at 23 ("In prison or out, the things that superpredators get by their criminal behavior-sex, drugs, money-are their own
immediate rewards. Nothing else matters to them.").
29. See id. at 23 (describing super-predators and predicting their increase).
30. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 4-5 (1998) ("[Birace
yourself for the coming generation of 'super-predators.")(quoting Hearing on Youth
Violence, Gangs, and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Before the Subcomm. on
Early Childhood, Youth and Families, 104th Cong. 3 (1996) (statement of Rep.
McCollum, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (emphasis in original)); Jim
Atkinson, Thrill Killers, TEX. MONTHLY, Nov. 1996, at 126-33 ("The culprits this
time around are . . . a new breed of street criminals known as [super-predators]....
Their crimes are as savage as they are pointless."); Peter Annin, "Superpredators"
Arrive: Should We Cage the New Breed of Vicious Kids, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1997,
at 57. Lynne Abraham, Philadelphia District Attorney, opined: "We're talking
about kids who have absolutely no respect for human life." See Dilulio, supra note
7, at 23; see also Richard Zoglin, Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Time Bomb,
TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 52 (discussing the "future crime patterns" of America's
youth).
31. See Dilulio, supra note 7, at 23 (commenting on the increasing perception of
youths as "hardened" and "remorseless").
32. Most gangs were ethnically based and non-White. Two African-American
gangs in Los Angeles, the Crips and the Bloods, gained notoriety in the 1980s,
giving the city the dubious distinction of being known as the "gang capital of the
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In this climate, vivid images of scary teenage criminals
captured the public imagination, distorting perceptions about the
threat of juvenile crime. Surveys showed that the public thought
that most violent crime was committed by juveniles, while in fact,
they were responsible for about thirteen percent." The public also
thought that juvenile crime was on the rise after many years of
steady decline." Politicians fueled these misperceptions. In 2000,
the District Attorney of Ventura County, California, published an
op-ed supporting Proposition 21-an initiative expanding the net
of criminal court jurisdiction over juveniles." He described gang
violence as a growing problem and "the most alarming of all crime
trends."36 At that time, gang violence had been declining for
several years and was lower than it had been in decades."
The 1999 school shootings at Columbine High School in
Colorado provide an example of the dynamic of a moral panic.3 "
Understandably, the horrific incident was the focus of massive
media attention. Cover stories in national magazines pondered
the meaning of the killings and the dangers that children faced in
school; some described an alarming escalation of school violence."
nation." Robert Conot, L.A. Gangs: Our City, Their Turf, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1987, at El. One commentator described gangs as "a breakdown of the moral
order, an evil in which racial or ethnic ties have been perverted for criminal gain."
Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibilityand the Criminalizationof Youth
Gangs, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 945 (1993).
33. A 1996 survey of 1,000 likely California voters found that sixty percent of
respondents believed that juveniles were responsible for most violent crime; in
reality, only thirteen percent of arrests for violent crimes involved juveniles. See
LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE, & CRIME IN
THE NEWS, in BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH 3 (2001), available at
http://www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf.
34. In a 1998 study of 2,000 adults, sixty-two percent of respondents believed
youth crime was on the rise, while the National Crime Victimization Survey for
that year revealed youth crime to be at its lowest rate in the twenty-five-year
history of the survey. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 33, at 3. A 2000
California poll found that a majority of voters thought youth crime was increasing,
although the crime rate had been decreasing steadily for at least five years. See
JUST. POL'Y INST., SCHOOLS AND SUSPENSIONS: SELF-REPORTED CRIME AND THE
GROWING
USE
OF
SUSPENSIONS,
Sept.
1,
2001,
available
at
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/jpilsss.pdf.
35. SCoTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 102-07.
36. Id. at 107.
37. Id. at 105.
38. See Egan, supra note 24, at A24 ("The more troubling question, perhaps, is
why the normal problems of adolescence seem to be resolved now in extraordinary
spasms of violence.").
39. In the wake of the Columbine shooting, one reporter described a trend of
"alienated youths" against a backdrop of "violent and nihilistic" popular culture.
Id.; see also Lauren Terrazzano, The Colorado Tragedy: Shooting Upsets Notion of
Suburban Sanctuary:Local Anxiety in Wake of Colorado Massacre,NEWSDAY, Apr.
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In fact, school shootings have always been extremely rare events
(children face a greater risk of being struck by lightning). School
shootings were even fewer in the late 1990s than a decade
earlier.4 ' Nonetheless, in the wake of Columbine, legislatures
across the country rushed to pass strict zero tolerance laws,
making it a crime to threaten violence in school."
The upshot is that by the beginning of the twenty-first
century, traditional juvenile crime policy had been largely
dismantled. Critics, both academics like Barry Feld and myself,
and advocates like Bob Schwartz and Marsha Levick, challenged
the move to criminalization as unfair to kids and ineffective at
preventing crime and observed that the burden of punitive laws
fell disproportionally on minority youths-but these arguments
gained little traction in the political arena in the 1990s. 42
II. Dissipation of the Moral Panics
In the past decade, the moral panics have gradually subsided,
and juvenile crime has faded as a hot political issue.4 Many
lawmakers and politicians-from the Supreme Court to big city
mayors-appear ready to rethink the punitive approach of the
1990s, and recent surveys indicate strong public support for a
rehabilitative approach to teenage crime." Public safety is still
important, of course, and it would be an exaggeration to report a
22, 1999, at A23. For general discussion of the exaggerated perceptions of the
threat of school violence, see CORNELL, supra note 25, at 11-23 (Lane Akers ed.,
2006).
40. GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 20, at 46 (detailing declining
incidences).
41. These laws were sometimes enforced rigidly against very young children.
See, e.g., Joan M. Wasser, Zeroing In On Zero Tolerance, 15 J.L. & POL. 747, 747-59
(1999).
42. See Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 801, 827
(Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop eds., 2012) (arguing that treating juveniles as
criminals corresponds with increased recidivism); see also Marsha Levick & Neha
Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a ConstitutionalRight
to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 175, 182
(2007) (asserting that juveniles are ill-equipped to handle the criminal process in
comparison with their adult counterparts); Robert Schwartz, Kids Should Never Be
Tried as Adults, CNN (Feb. 18, 2010, 8:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/
OPINION/02/18/schwartz.kids.trials/index.html (arguing that the culpability of a
juvenile is not the same as the culpability of an adult for the same offense).
43. ScoTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 11.
44. Daniel S. Nagin et al., Public Preferences for Rehabilitation Versus
Incarcerationof Young Offenders: Evidence from a Contingent Valuation Study, 5 J.
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 627, 629 (2006) (showing greater willingness to pay for
rehabilitation than incarceration where both were described as equally effective at
reducing crime).
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widespread repudiation of punitive policies. But it seems that
paternalism toward young offenders has begun to reemerge in
updated form in the early twenty-first century.
How can we explain the change in attitudes? Certainly it is
important that juvenile crime rates declined and that the
predicted wave of super-predators never materialized." After a
decade or so, politicians and the public seemed to realize that the
threat of juvenile crime was not as great as it had appeared to be
in the 1990s.16 We might also speculate that another threatIslamic terrorists-supplanted teenage criminals as the most
feared enemies of society." At a more practical level, state
governments began to recognize the high cost of incarcerationbased policies, particularly as tax revenues fell during the
recession.'
Just as important, a growing body of research
indicated that recidivism rates were depressingly high for youths
released from incarceration, while some community-based
correctional programs showed better outcomes at a fraction of the
cost.49
45. Violent juvenile crime rates began a steady, decade-long decline in 1994;
rates declined for other crimes shortly thereafter. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OFF. OF
JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, JUVENILE
ARREST
RATE
TRENDS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JARDisplay.asp?ID=qa05200
("The juvenile
arrest rate for all offenses reached its highest level in the last two decades in 1996,
and then declined 43% by 2010."); CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2008
3 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf
(describing declining rates for specific offenses).
46. See ScOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 11-12 (discussing political
reforms seeking more moderate punishments for juvenile offenders).
47. See, e.g., Alex Gourevitch, Fear, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 7, 2011,
http://chronicle.com/article/Era-in-Ideas-Fear/128492 (arguing that terrorism is
society's greatest fear).
48. See JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR EcON. & POL'Y RES., THE HIGH
BUDGETARY
COST
OF
INCARCERATION
10
(2010),
available
at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf
("[Bly far
the largest share of the costs of corrections are borne by state and local
governments.").
49. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing states' decisions
to close juvenile penal institutions to shift resources to more effective community
programs). The 2009 New York Governor's Task Force report emphasized the high
cost of institutionalization of youths ($210,000 per year per youth), the majority of
whom were misdemeanants, and their very high recidivism rates. VERA INST. OF
JUST., CHARTING A NEW COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING JUVENILE
JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 10 (2009). The system's punitive approach, it stated,
"damaged the future prospects of these young people, wasted millions of taxpayer
dollars and violated the fundamental principles of positive youth development." Id.
at 8. New York City officials responded by announcing a drastic reduction in the
number of city youths sent to state institutions. Julie Bosnan, City Signals Intent
to Put Fewer Teenagers in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at A31, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/nyregion/21juvenile.html?ref=nyregion&pagew
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A more intangible influence on law and policy in recent years
has been the view that imposing harsh criminal punishment on
young offenders violates basic notions of fairness at the heart of
any legitimate justice system." This, of course, is the essence of
the Supreme Court's opinions-and the Court's powerful message
has resonated through the justice system-challenging a regime
that has ignored differences between juveniles and adults." But
these ideas were already beginning to have an influence in the
political arena.

III. Characterizing Contemporary Young Offenders
The change in attitudes about juvenile crime is most evident
in the way that young offenders are characterized today in
political and legal settings. Perhaps, somewhere out there, an
angry politician is talking about vicious young super-predatorsbut I don't know where. Instead, Supreme Court Justices,
governors, legislators, media types and journalists describe
juvenile offenders as youths whose crimes are a product of
developmental immaturity and whose maturity into non-criminal
adulthood is a reasonable policy goal."
To some extent this change of heart may not be so surprising.
Paternalistic attitudes about children and youth were submerged
in the 1990s, but they are deeply embedded in our culture, and
with the reduced focus on the threat of juvenile crime, they seem
to have reemerged. But today's teenage offenders are less likely to
be depicted as innocent children than they were a few decades ago.
Instead, a more sophisticated account of the differences between
juvenile and adult offenders, informed by scientific knowledge
about adolescence, particularly developmental brain research, has

anted=print. Most youths would remain in their homes and receive therapeutic
services that had been shown to reduce crime more effectively than
institutionalization at a fraction of the cost. Id. (describing a cost of $17,000 per
youth).
50. See Schwartz, supra note 42.

51. Another fairness concern has contributed to uneasiness with the punitive
regime that took shape in the 1990s-that minority youths disproportionately were
adjudicated as adults and received harsh sentences. At least one recent legislative
reform was explicitly motivated by this concern; in 2005, Illinois repealed a statute
mandating transfer of fifteen-year-olds who sold drugs near a school or housing
project when it became clear that those charged under the statute were
overwhelmingly minority youths. ILL. JUV. JUST. INITIATIVE, CHANGING COURSE: A
REVIEW OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF DRUG TRANSFER REFORM IN ILLINOIS 4 (2008).
52. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2012) (emphasizing that
when imposing sentences, states must provide "some meaningful opportunity for

release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation").
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emerged.53
Stephen Morse, in his Symposium Article, discusses this
neuroscience research and how it might inform our understanding
of juvenile offending.' M What I would note is simply the level of
interest in "the teen brain" among lawmakers, the media, and the
public in recent years." Policymakers at all levels have invoked
adolescent brain research in rationalizing legal reforms that deal
more leniently with juveniles than adults-accepting the view that
immature brain functioning contributes to adolescents' decisions
to get involved in criminal activity.56 For reasons that are unclear,
many observers seem to find the neuroscience evidence more
compelling than the extensive body of behavioral research that is
largely confirmed by the brain studies. Whether the interest in
developmental neuroscience on the part of the public and
politicians played a causal role in creating more benign attitudes
toward young offenders is unclear, but this research has strongly
reinforced the contemporary view that much adolescent criminal
activity is driven by transient developmental immaturity-and
that adult criminal punishment may not be appropriate.
IV. Juvenile Offenders in the Supreme Court
The three recent Supreme Court Eighth Amendment
opinions were decided against this backdrop of changing attitudes
and all draw on developmental research in rejecting harsh
sentences as excessive for juvenile offenders. Roper v. Simmons,
in 2005, cited behavioral research in holding the death penalty

53. Kelly Richards, What Makes Juvenile Offenders Different From Adult
Offenders?, 409 TRENDS & ISSUES ON CRIM. JUSTICE 1, 3-4 (2011) (discussing
research on juvenile brain development).
54. Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome Redux: More Cognitive
JurotherapyIs Indicated, 31 LAW & INEQ. 509 (2013).
55. See Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teen Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 2000,
at 58; Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick?, TIME, Sept. 26, 2008, at 56;
Malcolm Ritter, Experts Link Teen Brains'Immaturity, Crime, USA TODAY (Dec. 2,
2007, 12:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2007-12-02-teenbrainsN.
htm.
56. For a discussion of the reforms, see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at
96-99.
57. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development
Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 739, 742 (2009). Observing that the Court
is more willing to accept behavioral research when accompanied by neuroscience
research, Laurence Steinberg describes a portion of Seth Waxman's oral argument
for the abolition of the juvenile death penalty in Roper. Prompted by Justice
Breyer's inquisition into whether or not the current research is something more
than "every parent already knows," Waxman responded, "I'm not just talking about
social science here, but the important neurobiological science." Id.
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unconstitutional for a crime committed by a juvenile, while
Graham v. Floridaand Miller also invoked neuroscience research
in striking down LWOP sentences." Each of these decisions rests
primarily on a developmentally informed proportionality analysis.
First, the Court emphasized that juveniles have "greater prospects
for reform"" than do adults because most teenage offending is the
product of "transitory" developmental influences."o But the heart
of the Court's proportionality analysis was its discussion of three
distinctive aspects of adolescence that mitigate the culpability of
young offenders. First, adolescents have diminished decisionmaking capacity due to their impulsivity, proclivity for risk-taking,
and deficiency in foreseeing consequences."
Second, they are
vulnerable to negative external pressures from peers and family to
a greater extent than adults, and thus they are less able than
adults to escape their social context.62 Third, an adolescent's
character is unformed-his or her criminal acts are less likely
than an adult's to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.63
On first glance, Miller appears more modest in its reach than
the two earlier decisions that imposed categorical bans on the
challenged sentences for juveniles. Miller simply prohibits a
mandatory sentence of LWOP for homicide.' In theory, as long as
the youth is permitted to introduce mitigating evidence of his
immaturity and circumstances, he or she could be subject to the
sentence-even a youth like Kuntrell Jackson-whose case was
joined with Miller-who was convicted of felony murder and whose
intent to kill was not proven. Nonetheless, in my view, Miller is
at least as powerful a statement about how juveniles should be
58. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); see also Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010) (citing brain research). In Miller, the Court noted
that brain development involved in behavioral control continues to mature through
late adolescence and explained: "[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds-for
example, in parts of the brain involved in behavior control." Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (internal quotations omitted).
59. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
60. Id. at 2465.
61. Graham, 130 S. Ct., at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2465.
62. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2454.
63. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
64. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2476.
65. Id. at 2468. Jackson was not the gunman in the convenience store hold up
that resulted in the death of the clerk; indeed he was outside for much of the crime;
and there was no evidence that he intended to kill the victim. Justice Breyer would
have prohibited LWOP without such evidence. Id. at 2476. The majority, although
it noted Jackson's diminished capacity, did not agree.
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dealt with in the justice system as the earlier opinions-and
apparently the dissenting justices thought so as well."
Miller is noteworthy in three ways that expand its
importance beyond its narrow holding. First, the Court (a critic
might say gratuitously) emphasized that, while it was not
categorically prohibiting LWOP as cruel and unusual punishment,
it expected the sentence to be "uncommon."" As Justice Roberts
noted in dissent, "uncommon" sounds a lot like "unusual" in
Eighth Amendment parlance, and he predicted that the next step
would be a categorical bar.68
Second, Miller follows Graham in making explicit that
juveniles have a very special Eighth Amendment status. The
Court has long adopted a two-track approach to reviewing the
constitutionality of criminal sentences under the Eighth
Amendment."
The mantra "death is different" captures the
distinction; the Court has applied rigorous proportionality review
to the death penalty" but has been extremely reluctant to override
non-capital sentencing decisions (no matter how draconian) for
adults.'
Graham and Miller afford juveniles facing LWOP
66. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2469.

68. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts speculates: "[T]he Court's gratuitous
prediction [that LWOP for juveniles should be uncommon] appears to be nothing
other than an invitation to overturn life without parole sentences ..... Id. at 2481
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
69. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
70. The Court has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for offenses
other than intentional killing, and for certain categories of offenders, such as
mentally retarded offenders and juveniles. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty was grossly disproportionate to the
crime of rape); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that execution
of mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the death penalty as punishment for the rape of a child); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 798-99 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the
death penalty for a defendant who aids or abets a felony that results in a murder
by others, when the defendant did not intend or attempt the murder himself);. see
also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(prohibiting mandatory imposition of death penalty and requiring that defendant
be evaluated individually, including evaluating mitigating factors).
71. In evaluating whether non-capital adult sentences are excessive, the Court
has required "gross disproportionality," a standard adopted from Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959-61 (1991) (plurality
opinion). See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-25 (2003) ("The
proportionality principles in our cases distilled in Justice Kennedy's concurrence
guide our application of the Eighth Amendment. . . ."). The gross disproportionality
standard is rarely met. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (holding that a life sentence
for a third felony was not grossly disproportionate); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.
63, 76-78 (2003) (denying petition for a writ of habeas corpus while upholding a life

2013]

JUVENILE CRIME REGULATION

547

protections that for adults are available only in the death penalty
context-the requirement of individualized sentencing72 and the
categorical exclusion of the sentence as excessive for certain
crimes. The Court actually made the link explicit, comparing
LWOP for juveniles to a death sentence." Indeed, Justice Kagan's
"If death is different, children are
already famous words:
different" announced a new principle with implications that
potentially reach far beyond LWOP."
The third noteworthy aspect of Miller reinforces this
principle. The Court insisted that the distinctive features of
adolescence that reduce youthful culpability are not crime
specific-they are as relevant to homicide as to non-homicide
offenses."
Implicit in this generalization of the Court's
proportionality analysis is a broader principle that the same
features of adolescence that mitigate the culpability of youths
sentenced to LWOP reduce the blameworthiness of juveniles'
criminal choices generally." In his dissent, Justice Roberts
lamented that there was "no clear reason that [Miller's] principle
would not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any
juvenile sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult
would receive."
I believe that Justice Roberts is correct, although it seems
unlikely that the Court will apply this principle as a constitutional
constraint on sentencing juveniles as broadly as he fears.
Nonetheless, the importance of these opinions is hard to
exaggerate. It is true that they affect a relatively small number of
offenders convicted of the most serious crimes." But following a
long period in which the relevance to criminal punishment of
differences between juvenile and adult offenders was either
sentence for three petty thefts, the third of which was the theft of video tapes worth
seventy dollars).
72. Before Miller the Court held that the prohibition of a mandatory sentence
only applied to the death penalty and not to non-capital sentences. See Harmelin,
501 U.S. at 1006.

73. The Court emphasized that LWOP "shares some characteristics with death
sentences that are shared by no other sentences." Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2466 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027).
74. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
75. Id. at 2465.
76. Id.

77. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Roberts also observed, "[The]
principle behind today's decision seems to be only that because juveniles are
different from adults, they must be sentenced differently." Id.
78. Adam Liptak, Juvenile Killers in Jail for Life Seek a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 20, 2011, at A13, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/us/
21juvenile.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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ignored or denied, our highest legal institution has emphatically
rejected the view of young criminals that dominated in the 1990s.
V. Juvenile Crime Regulation in the 21st century
Although the Court's views surely influence other lawmakers,
the Supreme Court does not dictate most juvenile crime
regulations." But changing attitudes toward young offenders have
affected policymakers at all levels of government; across the
country, there has been a rethinking of harsh incarceration-based
policies and a readiness to try different approaches." To be sure,
many (probably most) statutes mandating or allowing the adult
prosecution and punishment of juveniles are still in place." But
the recent legislative trend has been away from punitive laws.
Some states have repealed mandatory transfer statutes and others
have restricted the transfer of younger juveniles.2 Connecticut
raised its general jurisdictional age from sixteen to eighteen,
following a campaign in which supporters emphasized the
developmental immaturity of adolescents and the ineffectiveness
of adult punishment in reducing recidivism.' Even youths who
are tried as adults are more likely to receive different treatment
than a decade ago. A few states (most recently California in 2012)
79. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). The Court noted, "[iln general
we leave to legislatures the assessment of the efficacy of various criminal penalty
schemes," but went on to suggest that the execution of juveniles presented a special
case warranting judicial intrusion. Id.
80. See NAT'L JUV. DEFENDER CTR., JUVENILE DEFENDER RESOURCE GUIDE

(2012), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdfl2012_resource-guide/
NJDC ResourceGuide12.pdf (describing various legislative developments toward
rehabilitative and community-focused programs).
81. See Id.; GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 20, at 247-48 (describing how
moral panics are institutionalized through legislation which is difficult to undo).
82. For example, in 2009, the state of Washington, as part of a broad reform
moderating its approach to juvenile crime, repealed an automatic transfer statute
enacted in 1994 and also prohibited transfer of youths under the age of fifteen
except for murder or aggravated assault. 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 2276, available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/2009pam3.pdf.
See also
NAT'L JUV. DEFENDER CTR., supra note 80 (describing repeal of an Illinois statute
that mandated adult prosecution of fifteen year olds charged with selling drugs
near a school or housing project, on the basis of evidence that most of those charged
under the law were minority youths).
83. S. Rep. 1500, Gen. Assemb., June Sp. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (enacted)
(amending CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-120 to raise the age of juvenile
jurisdiction from sixteen to eighteen); see also CONN. JUV. JURISDICTION PLANNING
AND IMPLEMENTATION COMM., FINAL REPORT 2-4 (2007) (citing research, including
brain research on immaturity of juveniles and high recidivism rates of youths
receiving adult sentences as basis of raising jurisdictional age from sixteen to
eighteen), available at www.housedems.ct.gov/jjpic/070212 JJPIC-report
revised-pdf.
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have abolished the sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for
juveniles altogether.8 4 In Colorado, repeal followed a series of
sympathetic news stories highlighting differences between
adolescents and adults; politicians pointed to adolescent brain
research in explaining their support for the measure."
Legislatures in other states have passed laws requiring an
assessment of juveniles' competence to stand trial when they are
adjudicated as adults-addressing concerns raised by the Court in
Graham that some youths may be unable to function effectively as
defendants in criminal proceedings." As the differences between
juveniles and adults have become more salient, lawmakers have
increasingly paid attention to the values of procedural and
substantive fairness.
In terms of impact, the reforms that many states have
undertaken of their juvenile justice systems are just as important
as restrictions on criminal prosecution and punishment. Several
states, including California and New York, have dramatically
reduced the number of youths confined to state institutions,
shifting resources instead to community-based programs.
California, in 2007, dismantled the California Youth Authority
and closed most of its facilities." In New York, a task force
appointed by Governor Patterson issued a scathing report in 2009
harshly criticizing the state's juvenile justice system.' The report
noted that most youths placed in juvenile institutions, at a cost to

84. See SB 9 Is Signed into Law Giving Juveniles Serving Life-Without-Parole
Sentences A Second Chance, PAC. JUV. DEFENDER CTR. (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://www.pjdc.org/2012/10/sb-9-is-signed-into-law-giving-juveniles-serving-lifewithout-parole-sentences-a-second-chance/.
85. Miles Moffeit & Kevin Simpson, Research Points to Changing Teen Brain,
DENVER POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at Al; Miles Moffeit, Juvenile Justice Legislation a
Milestone in Sentencing, DENVER POST, May 28, 2006, at C3; see also Gwen Florio,
Sue Lindsey & Sarah Langbein, Life for Death: Should Teen Murderers get a
Second Chance at Freedom?, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sep. 17, 2005, at 1A (noting that
Governor Bill Owen pointed to brain research in explaining his support).
86. See, e.g., FLA. CODE ANN. § 985.223(1)(F) (describing mental capacities to be
addressed in evaluating juvenile's competence) (West 2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8291.07(B)(1)-(4) (West 2012); see also NAT'L Juv. DEFENDER CTR., STATE JUVENILE

JUSTICE LEGISLATION (2007), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/
2007 LegislativeSummary.pdf.

87. Pursuant largely to a 2007 statutory directive (SB 81 and AB 191), the state
renamed the CYA the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) and directed that most
convicted youths remain in their communities. See HISTORY OF THE DJJ, CAL. DEP'T
OF JUV. JUST., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/JuvenileJustice/DJJ History/
index.html. The DJJ census dropped by more than eighty percent. Id.
88. TASK FORCE ON TRANSFORMING JUV. JUST., CHARTING A NEW COURSE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE (2009)
[hereinafter CHARTING A NEW COURSE].
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taxpayers of $210,000 a year, were misdemeanants and that their
recidivism rates were appallingly high: seventy-five percent
reoffended within three years." The system's punitive approach,
the report stated, "damaged the future prospects of these young
people, wasted millions of taxpayer dollars, and violated the
fundamental principles of positive youth development.""o New
York City officials responded by announcing a plan to drastically
reduce the number of city youths sent to state institutions."
Under the plan, most youths have remained in their homes,
receiving therapeutic services that had been shown to reduce
crime more effectively than institutional placement at a fraction of
the cost. 92
Other states have implemented policies aimed at deterring
institutional placement and keeping youths in their communities."
Several jurisdictions, including Ohio and Illinois, have reversed
perverse financial incentives that previously encouraged judges to
sentence youths to state facilities, allowing localities to avoid the
cost of dispositions.
Other states, such as Maryland, have
adopted strategic plans, redirecting funds from secure institutions
to community programs."
And many states have reformed
residential placement itself, adapting a model developed in
Missouri that rejects prison-like institutions in favor of small
therapeutic facilities near offenders' homes. 96
Foundations have been important catalysts for 21st century
reform, working with states and localities to change juvenile crime
policy.The MacArthur Foundation, with its longstanding
commitment to bringing a developmental approach to juvenile
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Bosnan, supra note 49.
92. Id. (describing a cost of $17,000 per youth).
93. NAT'L JUV. JUST. NETWORK, BRINGING YOUTH HOME: A NATIONAL
MOVEMENT TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY, REHABILITATE YOUTH AND SAVE MONEY
(2011)
[hereinafter
BRINGING
YOUTH
HOME],
available
at
http://www.njjn.org/library/search-results?subject=8 (describing the move toward
community based sanctions in various states).
94. Id. at 5.
95. See
MD.
DEP'T
OF
JUV.
SERVS.,
CMTY.
SUPERVISION,
http://www.djs.state.md.us/community-supervision.asp (outlining the program).
96. See Mo. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., DIv. OF YOUTH SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR 2006, available at www.dss.mo.gov/re/pdf/dys/dysfy06.pdf.
Recidivism rates are reported to be far lower than the rates of youths coming out of
institutional placement. Id. (reporting recidivism rates of 8.7%). See Marian
Wright Edelman, Juvenile Justice Reform: Making the "Missouri Model" an
American
Model,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
21,
2010,
9:50
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marian-wright-edelman/juvenile-justice-reformmb_498976.html (advocating a nationwide shift to the Missouri Model).
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crime regulation, has pursued its ambitious Models for Change
program in a number of states." The Annie E. Casey Foundation
has reformed juvenile detention practices across the country
through its Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative (JDAI)
program that aims to reduce racial disparity in detention and
restrict it to those youths who represent a substantial risk."
As I have suggested, these reforms were motivated by a mix
of factors, and the goals of cutting costs and saving state resources
are high on the list. But policymakers are also coming to recognize
that locking kids up may not be the best way to reduce crime.9
This is not surprising given what we know about the important
role of social context in adolescent development." As the work of
Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier has shown, adult prisons and
institutional facilities are harmful developmental settings,o1 and
lengthy incarceration undermines opportunities for delinquent
youths to mature into productive adults.o2 Against the backdrop
of developmental knowledge, the high recidivism rates of youths
97. The Foundation, in collaboration with other funders, sponsored empirical
research on dimensions of adolescent development relevant to criminal activity and
to the adjudication of youths for their offenses. For general information, see
ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUV. JUST., www.adjj.org. The Models for Change program,
the centerpiece of The Foundation's recent juvenile justice efforts, is a collaboration
between the Foundation and targeted states to implement fairer and more
developmentally conscious juvenile justice models. See MODELS FOR CHANGE,
http://www.modelsforchange.net/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
98. See THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVE
INITIATIVE,

http://www.aecforgfMajorInitiatives/JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative.aspx
(last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
99. See, e.g., CHARTING A NEW COURSE, supra note 88 (highlighting the
evolution of policy making in New York).
100. Several environmental conditions provide the "opportunity structures" and
conditions necessary for healthy psychological development-the presence of an
authoritative adult parent figure; association with pro-social peers; and
participation in educational and other activities that facilitate the development of
autonomous decision-making and critical thinking skills. See He Len Chung,
Michelle Little & Laurence Steinberg, The Transition to Adulthood for Adolescents
in the Juvenile Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, in ON YOuR OWN
WITHOUT A NET: THE TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
(Wayne Osgood et al. eds., 2005).
101. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 227 (Jeffrey Fagan & Frank Zimring

eds., 2000). The deficiencies of institutional settings (especially prisons) include
impersonal relationships between inmates and adult staff, unstructured
interactions with fellow inmates, and inadequate educational, mental health and
occupational services. See also Martin Forst, Jeffrey Fagan & Scott Vivona, Youths
in Prisons and Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the TreatmentCustody Dichotomy, 40 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1989); CHARTING A NEW COURSE,
supra note 88, at 19, 47, 57-62.
102. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 101, at 264-65.
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States have
released from these facilities is not surprising.'
is often
public
safety
the
view
that
embraced
increasingly
through
offenders
promoted by addressing the needs of young
homes.'
near
their
scientifically based rehabilitative services
This more pragmatic approach to youth crime regulation has
been possible, in part, because teenage crime has not been a
pressing social concern-other threats, such as terrorism and
Under these
economic decline have become more urgent.'
conditions, policymakers have been more inclined to deliberate on
the long term costs and benefits of various policies and to focus on
values such as fairness and racial justice-considerations that got
little attention in the late twentieth century.106 In combination,
the promise of cost savings, crime reduction, and better long-term
outcomes for youths have led many states to substantially revise
their juvenile justice policies to incorporate the lessons of modern
Interestingly, contemporary knowledge
developmental science.'
has contributed to a revival of the principle that animated the
traditional juvenile court-that young offenders are different from
their adult counterparts and should be dealt with differently when
*108
they commit crime.
VI. Forestalling Future Moral Panics
This account of the evolution of youth crime regulation over
the past generation seems like a story with a happy ending-one
in which the lawmakers have accepted the lessons of
developmental science and henceforth will regulate juvenile crime
in ways that reduce its social cost are also fairer to young
offenders. There is a lot to like in this story. Unfortunately, I
need to interject a note of realism: there is little reason to be
confident that the relatively benign attitudes supporting the
current sensible policies will persist. The forces that triggered
public fears in the 1990s are likely to be activated again at some

103. Id. at 261.
104. The most effective programs adopting this approach have been evaluated
repeatedly over a twenty-year period. ScOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 215-21
(describing effective programs using this approach).
105. See Mussarat Khan & Kathryn Ecklund, Attitudes Toward Muslim
Americans Post-9/11, 7 J. MUSLIM MENTAL HEALTH 1 (2012) (reviewing the
research showing drastic increases in violence against and fear of Muslims in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th).
106. See, e.g., CHARTING A NEW COURSE, supra note 88.
107. See, e.g., id. at 10.
108. Nagin et al., supra note 44 (finding that public attitudes toward juvenile
crime once more favor rehabilitation).
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point-resulting in new moral panics directed at young criminals,
and predictably leading to new, punitive legal reforms." So the
question I would like to address in conclusion is whether there is
anything we could do to reinforce the current legal trend. I think
the answer is "possibly"-lawmakers may be able to adopt what
might be called precommitment strategies to deter future moral
panics or at least reduce their social cost."0
The problem with decision-making during a moral panic is
that it is driven by pressing immediate concerns-punishing
criminals, protecting the public, and avenging victims. In a
climate of fear and anger, distorted perceptions of the threat result
in precipitous decisions, while long term goals or interests that (in
the abstract) most would acknowledge are as (or more) important,
tend to be ignored or discounted. So in the rush to protect the
public from juvenile crime in the 1990s, little attention was paid to
the financial cost of the punitive reforms, their fairness, their
impact on young offenders' lives, or even whether they were
effective at reducing crime (except in the most immediate sense)."'
In calmer times, deliberation is possible and government officials
are more likely to consider these long-term goals and concerns in
making decisions. And, essentially, that is what has happened.
To the extent that there has been a policy shift in recent years, it
is because these broader considerations have been weighed in the
calculus-something that didn't happen in the 1990s.112
So what is the remedy for the moral panic problem? Here I
turn to decision theory and research, which provides a framework
for thinking about the major problem that we face in framing
juvenile justice policy and suggests that it is not uncommon in
human experience. In many domains, individuals are sometimes
tempted to make decisions based on compelling, but transitory,
preferences, while discounting stable long-term goals and future
consequences." 3 The dieter who reaches for a piece of chocolate
109. The drug panics serve as a useful analogy, with resurgences in the 1960s,
80s, and 90s. Crime generally tends to be cyclical; thus it would not be surprising if
a new panic over juvenile crime arose in the future. For a more thorough analysis
of the drug panics, see GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 20.110. For a general
discussion of the function of precommitment strategies, see infra 124-25 and
accompanying text.
110. For a general discussion of the function of precommitment strategies, see
infra 124-25 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., CHARTINGA NEW COURSE, supranote 88.
112. See. id.
113. The problem of inconsistent choice over time was first identified by R.H.
See R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility
Strotz.
Maximization, 23 REV. EcON. STUD. 165 (1955-56). For multiple perspectives on
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cake is a good example from everyday life. But decision theory
also suggests that individuals and lawmakers can employ
corrective precommitment strategies to assist them in adhering to
their long-term interests and goals." In our context, lawmakers
acting during a period when deliberation is possible can adopt
policies that could promote better decision-making in the future by
avoiding ill-advised actions and by incorporating consideration of
long term interests into the regulatory process.
A. Restricting Prosecutorsand Judges

First, prosecutors and judges are front line decision-makers.
Simply by virtue of their roles in the justice system, they are most
subject to pressure to respond to the criminal acts of teenagers on
the basis of immediate concerns, such as punishing the criminal
and assuaging angry victims and the public. Clear statutory
directives allowing criminal court prosecution only when fairness
and social welfare goals support it can insulate these officials from
these pressures.
Removing prosecutors' authority to make
jurisdictional decisions" and limiting transfer eligibility to older
juveniles charged with serious violent felonies" would go some
distance toward achieving this goal.
B. Legislative Precommitments

Precommitments that restrict and guide future legislative
decisions are trickier, since a future legislature can always repeal
any statutory restraint. But, in other areas, lawmakers have
this problem, see GEORGE LOWENSTEIN & JON ELSTER, CHOICE OVER TIME (1992).
114. Political economist Thomas Schelling has explored numerous situations
from everyday life in which individuals use precommitment strategies to adhere to
their long-term goals. See THOMAS SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83-95
(1984); Thomas Schelling, Self Command in Practice, in Policy and in a Theory of
Rational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1984). Schelling offers a long list of
precommitment strategies and tactics, including relinquishing authority to
someone else, contracting, arranging delays, rewards and penalties, establishing
enforceable rules. See also Strotz, supra note 113 (introducing precommitment as a
response to problem of inconsistent choice); George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, SelfControl, in CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 113, at 177-85 (discussing types of
precommitments).
115. This would include repealing direct-file statutes, but also automatic
transfer laws, under which prosecutors can choose whether to charge youths with a
transferrable offense or with a less serious crime that will be adjudicated in
juvenile court. See PATRICIA TORBET, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION,
STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME (1996), available at
http:/Incjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf. (describing the enactment of these laws).
116. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 96 (recommending that only fifteen
year old youths previously convicted of a serious violent crime and currently
charged with such a crime be eligible for transfer).
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adopted legislative strategies to promote deliberation, focus
decision-making on policy goals and monitor legislative actions for
consistency with these goals, and generally they have not been
inclined to repeal constraints when they are inconvenient."' Some
such mechanisms could be adapted to the context of juvenile crime
regulation.
First, legislatures can enact a version of what William
Eskridge and John Ferejohn call "super-statutes""-in this case, a
comprehensive statute setting in place substantive juvenile crime
policies-announcing the principles, goals and guidelines to direct
lawmakers in the future. In other substantive areas, lawmakers
have shaped the future direction of policy through such statutes.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), for example,
establishes broad environmental goals and policies, and institutes
procedures to promote adherence to these policies."' Similarly, a
comprehensive juvenile justice statute can establish scientificallybased policies that further the substantive goals of recidivism
reduction, cost effectiveness, and public protection, as well as
fairness and proportionality, together with procedural
requirements that maximize the likelihood that future regulation
will conform to these goals and principles.
What procedural requirements can encourage future
lawmakers to adhere to (or at least be aware of) long-term goals?
117. Consider the Senate cloture rule, which allows a minority of the body to
block legislation unless overridden by sixty votes. U.S. SENATE, FILIBUSTER AND
CLOTURE ORIGINS & DEVELOPMENT, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/

common/briefing/Filibuster Cloture.
htm. In theory, this requirement could be ignored or overridden by a majority vote,
and while majority Senators occasionally have expressed interest in repeal, the
cloture rule stands. Steven Portnoy, Senate Majority Rules? Senator Wants
Showdown on Filibuster Reform, ABC NEWS, Dec. 31, 2010, available at

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/senate-majority-rules-senator-showdown-filibusterreform/story?id=12511495 (reporting on Senator Tom Udall arguing for reform of
filibuster rules).
118. These scholars coined this term to describe federal laws that create "a new
normative or institutional framework for state policy." They argue that superstatutes (such as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
embody far-reaching and fundamental principles and have transformed an area of
law (on their view, super-statutes can only be identified ex post). William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L. J. 1215, 1215 (2001).
The aspiration of comprehensive juvenile crime legislation would be similar.
119. The NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.

§§

4321-37, availableat www.nepa.gov, also requires federal agencies to evaluate the
environmental impact of proposed actions, regulations, programs and legislative
proposals. 40 CFR § 1508.18 (1970). Its goal is to require that agency decisionmakers be informed of the environmental consequences of their decisions. The
Environmental Protection Agency reviews and comments on other agencies'
analyses of environmental impact.
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Two possibilities are cost-benefit analysis and impact statements.
In other legal settings, government agencies are sometimes
required to undertake cost-benefit analyses to encourage
consideration of the predicted financial costs over time of a
proposed regulatory change.120 This practice could be beneficial in
the context of juvenile crime regulation as well. As we have seen,
legislatures rushing to enact laws in the midst of moral panics
seldom considered their long-term budgetary impact. This
problem can be mitigated if cost-benefit analysis is built into the
legislative and regulatory process.
Another procedural mechanism that could improve
deliberation in the lawmaking process is the requirement of an
impact statement.
Under NEPA, an environmental impact
statement is required when proposed government action is likely
to have substantial consequences for the environment.'2 1 Closer to
our context, some states require legislatures and agencies to
prepare racial impact statements when considering changes to
sentencing and other criminal justice policies.'22
These
requirements amount to mandates that lawmakers weigh (or at
least be aware of) long-term considerations that they otherwise
may discount in making regulatory decisions. A juvenile justice
impact statement could improve regulatory decision-making by

120. Cost benefit analysis is routinely used to evaluate environmental, health
and safety regulations and policies and create standards for industry practice. See
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,

NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., GUIDELINES FOR

PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES, available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/

eed.nsf/webpages/Guidelines.html (describing guidelines for cost benefit analyses,
their purpose, subject matter, etc.). The Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) directs federal agency cost-benefit analyses of proposed regulations,
which, in part, is directed toward evaluating the impact of regulations on private
business activity. In 2011, President Obama issued an executive order, generally
mandating that federal agencies undertake cost-benefit analysis of existing
regulations (for the reported purpose of assuring that regulations did not hamper
job creation). Exec. Order No. 13563, Press Release, White House, Executive Order
13563 - Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review (Jan. 18, 2011), availableat
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/18/improving-regulation-andregulatory-review-executive-order. Some states also use cost-benefit analyses. The
legislature in Washington State has created an independent institute to evaluate
the costs and benefits of social and educational programs, including juvenile justice
programs. See OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, supra note 11.

121. NEPA requires federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impact of
proposed actions, regulations, programs and legislative proposals. 40 CFR §
1508.18. The NEPA process requires either an Environmental Assessment (where
environmental impact is uncertain) or Environmental Impact Statement (a more
comprehensive evaluation).
122. Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements: Changing Policies to Address

Disparities
(2009),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/rd-abaarticle.pdf
(describing adoption of requirement and benefits of impact statements).
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focusing on long-term consequences that otherwise might be
ignored, including the likely effect of the proposed legal change on
incarceration rates and duration, recidivism rates, racial disparity,
and on the future educational and employment opportunities of
the youths affected by the law.
Finally, it is realistic to assume that, despite the adoption of
precommitment mechanisms, legislatures will sometimes enact illconsidered laws in response to public fears of teenage crime. But
the cost of such lapses can be contained through oversight by a
standing law revision commission, appointed by the legislature to
review juvenile crime regulation periodically to evaluate
conformity to established principles and goals. In the United
Kingdom and in several American states, independent law
commissions review different areas of law and propose legislative
reform when laws are outdated, inconsistent with contemporary
policies, or otherwise problematic.'
The evidence indicates that
these bodies have been remarkably effective; most reforms
proposed by standing law commissions have been adopted.'24 In
the context of juvenile crime regulation, an independent,
legislatively-appointed commission can perform an important
monitoring function, serving as a safeguard when the social costs
of laws enacted during periods of moral panic later become
evident. During calmer periods, legislatures may be open to
taking corrective action in response to law commission
recommendations.
As I have described the proposed precommitment framework,
you may have been asking yourself: "Why would any politician
support restrictions on their ability to act quickly in response to
urgent public concerns about juvenile crime in the future?" It is a

123. The U.K. commission, created as an independent body by Parliament in
1965, consists of five members who serve full time; the chair must be an appellate
judge. LAW COMMISSION: REFORMING THE LAW, http://www.justice.gov.uk/
lawcommission/about/who-we-are.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). Statutorily
created commissions have played important roles in proposing legislative reform in
New York and California. See NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION,

http://www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (describing the New
York commission's review and reform purposes); see also CALIFORNIA LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, http://www.clrc.ca.gov/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
124. More than two-thirds of the UK commission's proposed law reforms are
enacted or accepted by the government. See LAW COMMISSION, LAW COMMISSION
RECOMMENDATIONS:

IMPLEMENTATION

LOG,

available

at

http://www.justice.gov.uklawcommission/about/381.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2013).
Over ninety percent of California's Law Revision Commission's
recommendations have been enacted into law, affecting more than 22,500 sections
of the California statutory codes.

See CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION,

http://www.clrc.ca.gov/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
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good question, and I may not have a completely satisfactory
answer.
Even though most of the framework has been
implemented in other legal settings, the politics of crime is
different from environmental politics-and politicians may think
that the public will be outraged if the government seems
insufficiently responsive to a school shooting or gang killing.
These are legitimate concerns, but my, perhaps optimistic,
view is that public opinion may represent a less formidable
obstacle to reform than politicians assume. Substantial evidence
indicates that although the public cares about protection from
violent crime, it also endorses a rehabilitative approach for
juvenile offenders.12 ' The view that adolescents are different from
adult criminals may be forgotten during a moral panic, but recent
history shows that the demands for harsh punishment are likely to
fade over time, and paternalistic (and pragmatic) attitudes toward
youth reemerge. Ultimately, in calmer periods, the public realizes
that it is in society's interest to have both effective and fair
juvenile crime regulation. This is more likely to be achieved by
attending to the features of adolescence that distinguish teenage
criminal activity.
This Symposium has been convened at an exciting time in the
history of juvenile justice policy, a period in which we have a
window of opportunity for a new wave of law reform. It may seem
like the wrong time to be looking back at the bad old days. But, in
my view, our best hope of sustaining our current policy direction
and of reinforcing the perspective on adolescent offending
endorsed by the Supreme Court is to think about how to avoid
returning to a period during which a lot of harm was done by
(mostly) well-meaning officials who thought they were effectively
combating youth crime.

125. See, e.g., Nagin et al., supra note 44 (showing greater willingness to pay for
rehabilitation than incarceration where both were described as equally effective at
reducing crime); Julian Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Justice, 31 CRIME &
JUST. 495 (2004) (showing considerable support for rehabilitative programs).

